Freeman Dyson and the Missile Crisis
An Essay for the Federation of American Scientists'
roundup of views on the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis
By Phillip F. Schewe
In 1962 Freeman Dyson was known chiefly for his feats in physics and engineering. In this note I should like to recount some of his achievements in the area of nuclear politics, especially as they relate to the events of October 1962.
Dyson was involved with the FAS in the 1940s. In the 1960s FAS was glad to have him on their council since as a test ban treaty opponent he helped to counteract the FAS's apparently liberal tilt. Moreover, as a consultant for the Livermore and Los Alamos weapons labs and as a frequent essayist on defense matters, Dyson had excellent nuclear credentials. Then, during the greatest period of peril—parts of 1962 and 1963—Dyson was FAS chairman.
A long concern with the dangers of nuclear weapons prompted him to work for two summers at the new Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The chief issue then was the pending test ban treaty. Dyson, expressing his disenchantment in Foreign Affairs, was against any such a treaty, believing that the West needed flexibility in its development of better weapons.
But then his view began to change. One of his jobs was tallying the atmospheric radiation spawned by open air testing of nuclear bombs. The deadly aggregate he found appalling. Furthermore, he attended two “Pugwash” conferences in England in the fall of 1962, the point being to bring together scientists in order to diffuse mistrust between the two sides and to propose peaceful alternatives. “I lived for four days mentally in a disarmed world, with all its difficulties,” said Dyson, “and the longer I was there the better I liked it.”
The Cuban missile crisis changed things. Test ban negotiations resumed with a greater urgency then in the preceding years. The last major impediments to a treaty, ironically enough, were bomb explosions for peaceful purposes, such as Project Plowshare. The Russians were against exempting tests for this kind of activity. The Americans were ardently in favor. When Averill Harriman, the chief US negotiator in Moscow, had extracted as many concessions as he could from the Russians, and still found the them adamant against peaceful tests, he cabled the President Kennedy to see if Plowshare could be sacrificed in the interest of obtaining a treaty.
The president quickly sought the advice of the ACDA director, who in turn consulted his science and technology bureau, which turned to Freeman Dyson. Should we cling to Plowshare or aim for a treaty? Dyson quickly weighed his loyalties to Edward Teller at Livermore (where Dyson had briefly worked on an early form of neutron bomb) against his loyalty to friends like Hans Bethe and, of course, to the prospects for greater comity with the Russians. Dyson’s considered opinion, which percolated its way back up the chain of command and thence to Moscow, was that the Russians should have their way. "Peaceful" tests of nuclear explosions in the air, space, and ocean were abandoned, and a treaty was achieved.
Dyson, who later testified in Congress on behalf of the treaty, diminishes his own role in this saga. No doubt the president and ACDA officials consulted numerous experts along the way, Dyson said, leading to the concession on peaceful testing. The important thing was that the treaty was in place and new manmade atmospheric radiation soon cease. Bombs had not fallen in 1962, and now they would not even be tested in the open air.
An Essay for the Federation of American Scientists'
roundup of views on the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis
By Phillip F. Schewe
In 1962 Freeman Dyson was known chiefly for his feats in physics and engineering. In this note I should like to recount some of his achievements in the area of nuclear politics, especially as they relate to the events of October 1962.
Dyson was involved with the FAS in the 1940s. In the 1960s FAS was glad to have him on their council since as a test ban treaty opponent he helped to counteract the FAS's apparently liberal tilt. Moreover, as a consultant for the Livermore and Los Alamos weapons labs and as a frequent essayist on defense matters, Dyson had excellent nuclear credentials. Then, during the greatest period of peril—parts of 1962 and 1963—Dyson was FAS chairman.
A long concern with the dangers of nuclear weapons prompted him to work for two summers at the new Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The chief issue then was the pending test ban treaty. Dyson, expressing his disenchantment in Foreign Affairs, was against any such a treaty, believing that the West needed flexibility in its development of better weapons.
But then his view began to change. One of his jobs was tallying the atmospheric radiation spawned by open air testing of nuclear bombs. The deadly aggregate he found appalling. Furthermore, he attended two “Pugwash” conferences in England in the fall of 1962, the point being to bring together scientists in order to diffuse mistrust between the two sides and to propose peaceful alternatives. “I lived for four days mentally in a disarmed world, with all its difficulties,” said Dyson, “and the longer I was there the better I liked it.”
The Cuban missile crisis changed things. Test ban negotiations resumed with a greater urgency then in the preceding years. The last major impediments to a treaty, ironically enough, were bomb explosions for peaceful purposes, such as Project Plowshare. The Russians were against exempting tests for this kind of activity. The Americans were ardently in favor. When Averill Harriman, the chief US negotiator in Moscow, had extracted as many concessions as he could from the Russians, and still found the them adamant against peaceful tests, he cabled the President Kennedy to see if Plowshare could be sacrificed in the interest of obtaining a treaty.
The president quickly sought the advice of the ACDA director, who in turn consulted his science and technology bureau, which turned to Freeman Dyson. Should we cling to Plowshare or aim for a treaty? Dyson quickly weighed his loyalties to Edward Teller at Livermore (where Dyson had briefly worked on an early form of neutron bomb) against his loyalty to friends like Hans Bethe and, of course, to the prospects for greater comity with the Russians. Dyson’s considered opinion, which percolated its way back up the chain of command and thence to Moscow, was that the Russians should have their way. "Peaceful" tests of nuclear explosions in the air, space, and ocean were abandoned, and a treaty was achieved.
Dyson, who later testified in Congress on behalf of the treaty, diminishes his own role in this saga. No doubt the president and ACDA officials consulted numerous experts along the way, Dyson said, leading to the concession on peaceful testing. The important thing was that the treaty was in place and new manmade atmospheric radiation soon cease. Bombs had not fallen in 1962, and now they would not even be tested in the open air.